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EXCLUSION OF DAMAGES DERIVED FROM
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS: TAX-




Following a jury verdict in an employment dispute, an attor-
ney negotiates a large settlement award for a client. The
pleadings alleged theories grounded in both tort and contract.
The settlement agreement and jury award did not specify which
claims were satisfied by the payment-only that the payment
satisfied all claims against the defendant. The client now wants
to know whether the proceeds from the settlement award are
subject to federal income tax and should be included in gross
income on the client's tax return for that year. In these circum-
stances the answer will depend largely on whether express lan-
guage found in the settlement agreement is supported by the
facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement. Under the
recent Tax Court decision in McKay v. Commissioner,1 and deci-
sions preceding it, the answer could well be that the settlement
award is taxable. However, awareness of the relevant case law
and proper planning by the practitioner throughout the litigation
process could change that answer.
McKay v. Commissioner, together with other decisions dis-
cussed in this Note, demonstrate the broad interpretation given
by courts to section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code ex-
cluding damages received "on account of personal injuries."2
Analysis of these decisions also reveals traps that can be avoided
through proper planning, thereby leading to favorable tax treat-
ment of a client's damage award.
This Note identifies the factors the Tax Court has examined
to determine whether the section 104(a)(2) exclusion will apply
to certain allocations of damages made in settlement. Part II of
1. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). For a thorough analysis of the
broad reach of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, particularly with regard to non-physical,
employment-related personal injuries, see J. Martin Burke & Michael K Friel, Tax
Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need For Limits, 50
MoNT. L. REv. 13 (1989) [hereinafter Limits]. The author gratefully acknowledges the
analytical assistance and insights of University of Montana School of Law Professor
and former Dean J. Martin Burke.
1
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this Note examines McKay, recounting the facts and comparing
the Tax Court's reasoning in that case with Robinson v. Commis-
sioner,3 another pivotal case dealing with settlement agreement
allocations. Part III provides historical background and analysis
of the decisions that established the factors applied in McKay
and a critique of the McKay decision. Finally, Part IV summariz-
es McKay's significant effect on tax consequences of damages
received on account of personal injury.
II. MCKAY V. COMMISSIONER
A. The Facts
In 1976, Ashland Oil, Incorporated (the Company), recruited
taxpayer Bill E. McKay (McKay)" because of his experience in
and specialized knowledge of the petroleum industry. When the
Company first approached McKay, he was reluctant to accept a
position based on his awareness that the Company allegedly had
made questionable payments to domestic and foreign officials to
secure oil during the 1960s and 1970s and had also made several
illegal political contributions during the Watergate era. Never-
theless, he accepted employment, eventually handling all of the
Company's crude oil supply acquisitions.5
In December of 1980, Orin Atkins (Atkins), the Company's
Chief Operating Officer and McKay's superior, made arrange-
ments for payment, of a $1.35 million bribe to Yehia Omar
(Omar), an official of the Sultanate of Oman, for the purchase of
his government's crude oil. Atkins insisted that McKay arrange
the transfer of funds, but McKay refused as it was his belief that
such a payment would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) as well as a 1975 consent decree that the Company had
made with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Despite McKay's persistent efforts to prevent it, the payment
was made. Subsequently McKay learned of the Company's at-
tempt to retrieve the bribe from Omar, but only by making an-
other payment to Omar as an incentive to rescind the earlier
deal. McKay also objected to this payment and attempted to
3. 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
4. McKay filed a 1988 joint income tax return with his wife Lana S. McKay.
102 T.C. at 465. Their joint return was the subject of the deficiency action brought
by the Service and which is the subject of this Note. However, for the purposes of
this Note, only McKay will be referred to as the taxpayer.
5. Id. at 468.
[Vol. 56604
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prevent it as well.'
In September of 1981, Atkins was replaced by John Hall
(Hall). Hall assured McKay that the Company's disguised pay-
ments and bribes would stop. Despite Mr. Hall's assurances, the
Company continued to make such payments
McKay's opposition to the payments to Omar tainted his
employment relationship with the Company. As a result, McKay
retained legal counsel to represent him in negotiating a satisfac-
tory termination of his employment with the Company. McKay
and the Company, however, were unable to reach a mutually
acceptable termination agreement."
During October and November of 1982, the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) contacted McKay and requested his re-
sponse to inquiries known as the "Five Questions." These ques-
tions all pertained to the Company's questionable business trans-
actions. The Company pressured McKay to sign responses favor-
able to its position, and similar to responses already submitted
by Hall to the Service. McKay refused to sign the responses since
he believed the statements contained therein to be false. McKay
instead gave answers which were significantly different than the
Company's predetermined responses.'
In May of 1983, the SEC subpoenaed McKay to testify re-
garding the Company's disguised payments and his responses to
the Service's Five Questions. Shortly thereafter, the Company
officially terminated McKay's employment.' °
B. The Legal Proceedings
One year after his termination, McKay initiated a civil ac-
tion against the Company in a United States district court as-
serting claims for wrongful discharge, breach of employment
agreement, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statutes, and for punitive damages. The
jury found that the Company breached its employment
agreement with McKay and wrongfully discharged him in viola-
tion of public policy."
6. Id.




11. Id at 470. The case was entitled McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43
(E.D. Ky. 1988Xthe wrongful discharge action). McKay's wrongful discharge action
was consolidated for discovery and trial with a suit brought against Ashland by an-
3
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On the basis of it findings at trial, the jury awarded McKay
$1,602,103 as damages for lost compensation. The jury also
awarded McKay "future" damages of $12,846,209. Due to the
Company's RICO violations the damages were trebled to more
than $43 million. Finally, the jury awarded McKay punitive
damages for wrongful, malicious, and oppressive acts in the
amount of $500,000 from the Company, and $750,000 from Hall.
Following the jury award and judgment, counsel for both
sides met to negotiate a settlement. While the negotiations were
hostile, the parties were nonetheless able to reach a settlement
agreement whereby the Company agreed to pay McKay
$16,744,300.12 The settlement agreement allocated $12,250,215
of that amount to payment of the wrongful discharge tort claim,
and $2,044,085 to payment of the breach of contract claim."3
The remaining $2,450,000 were allocated as partial reim-
bursement by the Company of McKay's legal expenses.
14
Throughout the negotiations, the Company refused to agree
on the allocation of any part of the settlement to either the RICO
claim or punitive damages. By contrast, McKay desired that a
portion of the settlement proceeds be allocated to the RICO claim
in order to publicize the Company's unlawful activity. McKay
reluctantly agreed to settle without such allocations because of
both the risks he would face on appeal and the fact that the
Company threatened to prolong the litigation for fifteen to twen-
ty years. The settlement agreement therefore expressly stated
that none of the settlement proceeds were being paid pursuant to
other former employee of the Company named Harry D. Williams (Williams).
Williams' case was entitled Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988Xthe
Williams case).
12. McKay, 102 T.C. at 471.
13. Id. at 472.
14. Id. at 473. With regard to the parties' allocations, the settlement agreement
provided:
G. Based upon the nature and origin of each Claim, Ashland and McKay
have agreed that:
(1) The sums allocable to the Wrongful Discharge Tort Claim, repre-
senting compensatory damages payable on account of an alleged tort-type
invasion of rights that McKay is granted by virtue of being a person in the
sight of the law, are properly excludable from McKay's gross income under
[§1 104(a)(2) .... and
(2) The sums allocable to the Contract Breach Claim, representing
compensatory damages payable on account of Ashland's alleged breach of
McKay's employment contract, constitute gross income to McKay within the
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RICO or for punitive damages. 5
The United States district court judge presiding over
McKay's wrongful discharge action concluded that the allocations
in the settlement agreement were reasonable and fairly reflected
the relative value of McKay's claims. McKay included the
amount of the settlement proceeds he and the Company allocat-
ed to the breach of contract claim ($2,044,085) in gross income
on his 1988 federal income tax return. 8 However, he excluded
the entire amount of settlement proceeds allocated to the wrong-
ful discharge tort claim ($12,250,215). The Service determined
that the entire amount of settlement proceeds McKay received
from the Company constituted compensation to him during 1988,
and therefore should have been included in his gross income for
that year.17
C. The Holding
The United States Tax Court held that McKay could exclude
from gross income the amount of settlement proceeds he and the
Company allocated to the wrongful discharge claim in their set-
tlement agreement. 8 The court based this holding on its find-
ings that the settlement agreement resulted from bona fide,
arm's length negotiations between adversarial parties'9 and
that the allocations accurately reflected the substance of the
claims settled by McKay and the Company." Accordingly, the
$12,250,215 payment allocated to the wrongful discharge claim
represented a payment for compensation of a tort-type personal
injury excludable under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.2
15. McKay, 102 T.C. at 473.
16. McKay also included the settlement proceeds allocated as partial reimburse-
ment of legal expenses from Ashland ($2,450,000). McKay's inclusion of this amount
in gross income is not, however, germane to the analysis in this Note.
17. Id. at 474.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Id. at 483-84.
20. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
21. Id at 487. The tax court ruled on several other issues that are not appli-
cable to the analysis in this Note. First, the tax court held that McKay could deduct
legal expenses that the settlement agreement with Ashland allocated to his expenses
in a shareholder's derivative suit against him, but could deduct his remaining legal
expenses (which were allocated to the wrongful discharge action) only to the extent
of wrongful discharge settlement proceeds. Id. at 487-94.
Second, the Tax Court held that McKay could not deduct payments made to
the law firm representing him, amounts claimed as "other legal expenses," mainte-
nance and storage expenses for business records, or expenses incurred as a consul-
5
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D. The Court's Analysis
The starting point for the court's reasoning in McKay was
the relationship of the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue
Code.22 Section 61 states that "all income from whatever source
derived" must be included in gross income.23 Section 104(a)(2)
adds that "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments)
on account of personal injuries" may be excluded from gross in-
come. 24 The court noted that the Treasury Regulations broadly
interpret the language of section 104(a)(2) to include damages
received "through prosecution of a legal suit or action based on
tort or tort-type rights, or through a settlement agreement en-
tered into in lieu of such prosecution."2' The court noted that
the section 104(a)(2) exclusion encompasses damages received for
both physical and non-physical (i.e., mental or emotional) inju-
ries.26
The court explained that in personal injury cases, it must
make a factual inquiry to determine the true substance or nature
of the settled claim. The court will therefore examine all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the settlement in the fol-
lowing ways:
(a) if no lawsuit was initiated the court must consider rele-
vant documents, letters, and testimony;
(b) in a case where a lawsuit was filed but not settled, or if
settled but no express allocations were made among the various
claims in the settlement agreement, then the court must consid-
er the pleadings, jury awards, or any court orders or judgments;
tant for a corporation because such claims were not substantiated. Id. at 494.
Third, McKay was denied a deduction for interest that accrued on money he
borrowed to pay legal expenses for the action against Ashland. The Tax Court found
that this was personal interest even though it related to McKay's trade or business
since he was in the trade or business of being an employee. McKay could, however,
deduct 40% of his interest for the taxable year 1988 because of a four-year phase-in
of a disallowance of his personal interest deduction. McKay, 102 T.C. at 494-95.
Finally, the court held that McKay was liable for a failure-to-file penalty. Id.
at 496-98. In support of its holding on this issue, the Tax Court found that McKay's
intentional delay in filing, designed to prevent the Company from gaining access to
his tax returns in order to determine whether he could withstand protracted litiga-
tion, did not constitute reasonable cause for failure to file.
22. Id. at 481.
23. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988).
24. I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
25. McKay, 102 T.C. at 481 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in
1970)).
26. Id. at 481 (citing United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992)).
608 [Vol. 56
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and
(c) if (like McKay), the taxpayer's claims were settled and
express allocations among the various claims are contained in
the settlement agreement, the court must carefully consider the
various claims."
The Service argued that, contrary to the express statements
in the settlement agreement, the entire amount of settlement
proceeds was attributable to McKay's breach of contract claim.
Thus, the proceeds were not excludable under section 104(a)(2)
but rather constituted gross income.
28
The Service supported its overall position with three specific
arguments. First, the Service argued that since the Company
could claim a section 162 business expense deduction on any
payments for damages, the Company was not actually adverse to
any particular allocation scheme. Section 162 provides that tax-
payers may deduct the cost of "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred... in carrying on any trade or business."29
The section 162 deduction encompasses civil damages. Therefore
the Company's settlement payments to McKay could indeed be
deducted.
Second, the Service argued that the character of the claims
in the settlement agreement must be based on the character of
the claims litigated against the Company. McKay plead four
claims at trial: wrongful discharge, breach of contract, RICO
violations, and punitive damages. However, the settlement
agreement included only two claims: tort and contract.
Third, the Service argued that all of the settlement proceeds
should be included in gross income because the jury awarded
treble damages derived from McKay's RICO claim, which was
based on injury to McKay's business or property. Since business
and property damages are outside the scope of the 104(a)(2)
exclusion, the proceeds from those claims would be properly
includable in gross income.3"
By arguing that the Company could deduct any payments
made to McKay, the Service attempted to dispel the notion that
27. Id. at 482-83.
28. Id. at 481.
29. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
30. The Service also advanced two alternative arguments in the McKay case:
First, that all of the settlement proceeds should be included in McKay's gross income
because they represented an accession to wealth-not a return of capital. Second,
since the claims in the Williams case were based on a contract theory and were
litigated contemporaneously with McKay's case, the two cases should reflect similar
claims. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484-487.
7
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the Company and McKay were adverse with respect to the tax
consequences of the settlement.31 The court disposed of that ar-
gument noting that while deductibility of the payor's payment
might be one factor to be considered in a determination of
whether the parties were adverse to their allocation, it is not
controlling.32
In making the argument that the character of settled claims
must reflect litigated claims, the Service focused on the jury's
award of back and future pay in its contention that McKay's
claims were purely contractual under Kentucky law. The court
rejected those assertions, thereby refusing to disregard the ex-
press language of the settlement agreement since the agreement
was consistent with Kentucky law, which recognizes both con-
tract and tort claims in employment dispute litigation.33
The court quickly dismissed the Service's third argument
that since the jury awarded treble damages for McKay's RICO
claim, which was based on injury to McKay's business or proper-
ty, all of the settlement proceeds should have been included in
gross income. The court stated that since the parties had not
expressly allocated any damages to RICO, the settlement agree-
ment would control.34
The McKay court further dismissed the Service's first alter-
native argument-that the entire settlement proceeds should be
included in McKay's gross income because such proceeds repre-
sented an accession to wealth. 3' The court explained that the
31. Id. at 485; Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 742, 745 (1982);
Black Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-61. The Service cited these two
cases in support of its argument. The court distinguished these cases on their facts
by pointing out that both cases involved allocations made in the purchase price of a
business, while the instant case dealt with hostile litigation-two sets of circum-
stances that were altogether different.
32. McKay, 102 T.C. at 485.
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id. at 486-87.
35. Id. Two theories have emerged with regard to the taxability of damages
awarded for personal injury: the return of capital theory and the accession to wealth
theory. Under the return of capital theory, damages awarded are intended to
compensate the injured party for injuries to one's personal rights and attributes
(although this theory is difficult to support given that under ordinary tax principles,
to apply the return of capital theory, one must establish an investment of capital in
the asset in question-a basis). The accession to wealth theory posits that taxpayers
who receive damages with no discernible basis realize gain to the extent of the dam-
age award. Taxpayers who receive punitive damages are generally regarded as hav-
ing acceded to wealth since punitive damages are not meant to compensate the in-
jured party. For an extensive discussion of the history and underlying tax policy of
those two theories and the § 104(a)(2) exclusion generally, see Douglas A. Kahn,
Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2
610 [Vol. 56
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Service had failed to recognize Burke for the proposition that
damages received on account of a tort or tort-like personal injury
are excludable under section 104(a)(2).36 The court also dis-
pelled the Service's second alternative argument, that the court
should compare McKay's claims with those of McKay's co-plain-
tiff, Williams. The court stated that it failed to see why Williams'
claims, which were based upon a different legal theory than
McKay's claims, should affect the instant case.37
Taking the opposite position, McKay argued that the alloca-
tions in the settlement agreement should be respected and that
the settlement proceeds expressly allocated to his wrongful dis-
charge tort claim should be excludable under section 104(a)(2).
The court accepted McKay's argument that the settlement agree-
ment was entered into by adverse parties at arm's length. The
court noted that, similar to previous decisions, the most impor-
tant factor bearing on the question of whether a payment was
made on account of tortious injury for purposes of exclusion
under section 104(a)(2) is the express language in the settlement
agreement itself." The McKay court, relying heavily on Robin-
son v. Commissioner,9 stated that it would not be bound by any
"factor or factors that are inconsistent with the true substance of
the taxpayer's claim" nor by express allocations in the document
itself if the parties did not "engage in bona fide, arm's length, ad-
versarial negotiations."'
In Robinson, the Tax Court considered the circumstances
under which it would disregard specific allocations of settlement
proceeds made in a written agreement. Robinson involved an
action initiated by the taxpayers (the Robinsons) in state court
against a Texas bank (the Bank) for failure to release a lien on
the Robinsons' property. Following a jury verdict of approximate-
ly sixty million dollars in the Robinsons' favor-including six
million dollars for lost profits, $1.5 million for mental anguish,
and fifty million dollars in punitive damages-the parties set-
FiA. TAx REV. 327 (1995).
36. McKay, 102 T.C. at 485 (citing United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867,
1870 (1992)).
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 482 (citing Byrne v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd and re-
manded, 883 F.2d 211, 89-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9500, 64 A.F.T.R.2d 89-5430 (3d
Cir. 1989); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67, 88-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (P-H) $ 9101, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 88-301 (3d Cir. 1987); Glynn v. Commissioner,
76 T.C. 116 (1981), affd without published opinion, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982)).
39. 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
40. McKay, 102 T.C. at 482.
9
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tled. The settlement agreement provided that the Bank pay the
Robinsons ten million dollars in consideration for the release of
the Bank from further liability. A final judgment was entered
allocating ninety-five percent of the ten million dollar settlement
payment to mental anguish and five percent to lost profits."
The Robinsons reported $246,758 on their 1987 Form 1040
as miscellaneous income.42 The Service brought a deficiency ac-
tion against the Robinsons arguing that only five percent of the
settlement proceeds was excludable from gross income.' The
Tax Court rejected the allocation in the final judgment because it
was uncontested, nonadversarial and entirely tax-motivated and
therefore did not accurately reflect the underlying claims."
Since the allocations in the Robinson settlement agreement
were so disproportionate to the jury's damage award and because
the settlement agreement did not provide adequate evidence of
the Bank's intent in making its payments, the court looked to
other facts and circumstances to determine the Bank's intent.
Specifically the court analyzed the Bank's interests in character-
izing the proceeds as either tort or contract damages and wheth-
er the Bank intended that the settlement proceeds be allocated
to the tort and contract claims in the proportions that they were.
Regarding these questions the court noted that the Bank's inter-
ests were adverse to those of the Robinsons only to the extent of
the negotiations regarding the amount of the settlement and that
the Bank did not intend to "settle one claim to the exclusion of
another."' Since the Bank evidently was indifferent to the allo-
cation of the settlement between the contract and tort claims,
the court further found that the Bank did not intend the alloca-
tions as they appeared in the settlement agreement. The Robin-
son court therefore concluded that the settlement negotiations
between the Robinsons and the Bank could in no way be charac-
terized as arm's length or adversarial with regard to the charac-
terization of the settlement proceeds."
41. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 118-24.
42. Of the $10 million in settlement proceeds the Bank paid out, the Robinsons
received $4,935,151.72. The balance of $5,064,848.28 went to the Robinsons' attor-
neys. The $246,758 the Robinsons reported was five percent of the total of the
$4,935,151.72. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. at 133-34.
45. Id. Although it is not stated, the Tax Court presumably took note of the
fact that the bank could deduct its payment as a § 162 trade or business expense.
I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
46. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 129.
612 [Vol. 56
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The McKay court distinguished the Robinson decision on the
grounds that the parties in McKay were "hostile adversaries with
respect to the allocations made in the settlement agreement,"47
while the payor Bank in Robinson "was not concerned with the
allocation among the taxpayers' various claims."" The court
characterized McKay's interests in the negotiations as "want[ing]
the settlement award to be as high an amount as possible to
compensate him for his losses and want[ing] [the Company] to be
punished for its behavior."49 The Company's interests in the
negotiations, on the other hand, were "to minimize the amount it
needed to pay petitioner as well as avoid making any payment
on account of petitioner's RICO claim."0 The court further
pointed out that the Company adamantly refused to settle if any
of the damages were to be allocated to RICO claims." Because
the parties expressly memorialized this understanding in the
settlement agreement, the McKay court found that evidence
bearing on the questions of hostile or adverse negotiations and
on the intent of the payor could be found in the settlement
agreement itself.52
Ultimately the court accepted the parties' express allocations
in the settlement agreement and held that the $12,250,215 pay-
ment allocated to the wrongful discharge tort claim represented
a payment for a tort-type personal injury. The court therefore




Prior to initiating lawsuits involving a personal injury, prac-
titioners should carefully analyze the potential tax consequences
of a jury or settlement award in their clients' cases. Robinson
and McKay apply a number of principles developed in previous
cases dealing with the section 104(a)(2) exclusion,53 and identify
47. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
48. Id. at 483.
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id.
51. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
52. Id, at 483-84.
53. The author relies substantially on analysis of the relevant case law decided
prior to Robinson and McKay as developed in Limits, supra note 2, at 38-40. In
Limits the authors concluded that the proceeds of most employment disputes are
derived from non-physical personal injuries and should logically be taxable. Id. If
11
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distinct factors that courts will consider when determining
whether to respect the allocation of damages or settlement
awards tax purposes. As the case law interpreting section
104(a)(2) reveals, taxpayers have met both success and failure in
their efforts to characterize payments as "damages on account of
personal injury." The results of those efforts provide a helpful
map to practitioners who seek the safe harbor of section
104(a)(2) exclusion for damages awards.
Only damages or compensation received on account of per-
sonal injury or sickness are excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2). The Service and the courts have allowed tax-
payers to exclude damages for both physical personal injuries,
and non-physical personal injuries." Because most of the recent
case law in the area of non-physical personal injury has emanat-
ed from the employment arena, the issue that frequently arises
in tax litigation is whether the action was based on tort or tort-
like rights, or, instead, was contractual in nature.
In employment cases, the Service has regularly focused on
the nature of damages claimed rather than on the nature of the
injury. The United States Supreme Court settled that issue in
Burke, concluding that the proper inquiry into the character of
jury or settlement awards for damages focuses on the nature of
the injury.55 The Service nonetheless persists in arguing that
damages awarded by a jury or agreed upon in a settlement
agreement are based on contractual rather than tort or tort-like
rights, as it did in McKay. 6
When courts decide whether to respect a settlement based
on tort or tort-like rights for purposes of section 104(a)(2), the
most important determination is whether the payor intended the
award to satisfy tort or tort-like claims. The court will therefore
analyze evidentiary factors found both inside and outside the
settlement agreement to determine the payor's intent. The most
important factor bearing on the question of the payor's intent is
the express language contained in the settlement agreement.57
In the absence of an express allocation in the settlement agree-
that were the state of the law, McKay would not have been litigated, since the com-
pensatory damages from McKay's settlement with the Company were derived from
non-physical personal injuries and would be includable in gross income.
54. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81, 88-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) T 9370, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 88-1285 (6th Cir. 1988).
55. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1871 n.6 (1992).
56. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 485 (1994).
57. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
614 [Vol. 56
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ment, the court will analyze the surrounding facts and circum-
stances to determine the payor's intent. However, the McKay
decision indicates that even if express allocation language ap-
pears in the agreement, the court will analyze the underlying
facts and circumstances to determine if the settlement alloca-
tions are meaningful. Evidentiary factors that courts have exam-
ined in such a determination include pleadings and other court
documents,58 correspondence between parties,59 insurance con-
tracts, ° and a payor's issuance of a Form 1099 to a taxpayer.6
If a settlement agreement lacks express allocation language
and the underlying facts and circumstances do not convincingly
indicate the payor's intent to extinguish tort or tort-like claims,
the result will be fatal to a taxpayer's case. In Agar v. Commis-
sioner,2 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff-taxpayer
could not exclude amounts received from his employer upon the
employee's resignation from the company. In that case, the court
concluded the evidence did not indicate that the company intend-
ed its payments to satisfy tort or tort-like claims. Some evidence
indicated that the taxpayer had resigned because of accusations
and criticisms leveled against him, but the settlement agreement
was devoid of any reference to those matters.6 The settlement
agreement only indicated that the taxpayer was leaving his em-
ployment because of a desire to return to public accounting."
The record further showed the employer intended its payments
to be a form of severance pay rather than compensation for any
possible defamation claims that the taxpayer may have had. 5
The Agar court thus emphasized that the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate that the company intended to compensate the tax-
payer for tort or tort-like claims. The court noted the lack of any
express language in the settlement agreement allocating pro-
ceeds to compensation for specific types of injury.6
58. Knuckles v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182
(1964), affd, 349 F.2d 610, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9629, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 5515
(10th Cir. 1965).
59. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
60. Madson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-325, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1615
(1988).
61. Ray v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 535, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) %1 50,187, 69
A.F.T.R.2d 92-953 (1992), aff"d, 989 F.2d 1204 (1993).
62. 290 F.2d 283, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9457, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 61-1423 (2nd
Cir. 1961), affg, T.C. Memo. 1960-21, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960).
63. 290 F.2d at 284.
64. T.C. Memo. 1960-21, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 118.
65. 290 F.2d at 284.
66. Id.
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As it became clear to the taxpayers in McKay and Robinson,
a court's findings of fact on the payor's intent is crucial. Because
the McKay court respected the express language in the settle-
ment agreement in its findings, McKay won his case on the issue
of allocation. If, like Robinson, the court refuses to respect the
allocations in the settlement agreement, the taxpayer will lose
the case. Therefore, an ideal settlement agreement would con-
tain, among other provisions, specific allocations of damages in
compensation for tort or tort-like injuries alleged and a specific
statement indicating that the payor intends to compensate the
plaintiff for the injuries alleged.
The importance of initiating a lawsuit with pleadings that
raise tort or tort-like causes of action was made clear in Knuck-
les v. Commissioner.67 In that case, a life insurance company
fired an employee for allegedly mismanaging the company. The
taxpayer sued the company for breach of contract.6 The taxpay-
er and his counsel apparently overlooked the importance of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) from the outset, since they did not plead a person-
al injury. Only after a settlement was reached, allocating com-
pensation to the contract claim, did the taxpayer introduce such
a theory.69 Not surprisingly, after securing a settlement without
admitting liability for a tort or tort-type act, the company re-
fused to later acknowledge liability for the benefit of the taxpay-
er.7° Since the settlement agreement did not require the compa-
ny to admit liability for a tortious act, the company had no rea-
son to admit liability later simply to allow the taxpayer to avoid
tax on his damages award. On the basis of the content of the
settlement agreement and the company's refusal to acknowledge
liability for any wrongdoing, both the Tax Court and the Tenth
Circuit determined that the company intended the settlement
proceeds only as compensation for breach of contract.71
The McKay court analyzed McKay's pleadings and other
court documents and found that they supported McKay's claim
that the action primarily raised the tort claim of wrongful dis-
charge, although breach of contract violations were alleged as
well.72 Because it found that the pleadings reflected the sub-
67. T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182 (1964), affd, 349 F.2d 610, 65-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) $9629, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 5515 (10th Cir. 1965).
68. T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 182.
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 21, 27-28 and accompanying text.
616 [Vol. 56
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/11
1995] TAX PLANNING IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES 617
stance of. the allocations in the settlement agreement, the court
respected the allocations.73 The jury did not specify the propor-
tion of damages it allocated to either theory of. recovery.74 In
assessing the allocations in the settlement agreement, the court
relied on McKay's pleadings at trial. Absent guidance from the
jury, the court had no precise way of independently analyzing
the parties' allocations. Since McKay allocated a reasonable por-
tion of settlement proceeds to the contract theory, the court will-
ingly accepted his allocations.
The presence of tort or tort-like theories of recovery in
McKay's pleadings proved to be one of the factors that legiti-
mized the parties' allocations. In the Robinson decision, however,
the court ignored the causes of action in the Robinsons'
pleadings, finding that the claims were unsupported by the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. The Robinson court, in con-
trast to the McKay court, focused its analysis on the proportion
of damages allocated to the various claims in the jury verdict at
trial.75 That court concluded that the allocations in the settle-
ment agreement should reflect the allocations made by the jury
in its verdict.76 Thus, the Robinson decision stands for the prop-
osition that taxpayers who are too greedy in their allocations to
tort or tort-like claims in a settlement document will not succeed
in the Tax Court when challenged. The allocations in the docu-
ment should be reasonably proportionate to the litigated claims,
particularly when the jury specifies its allocations. The Robinson
court, based on the proportions in the jury verdict, allowed an
exclusion of 37.331% of the settlement amount.77 The Robinsons
claimed that ninety-five percent of their settlement attributable
to tort or tort-like theories. 7' By making such a disproportionate
claim, the Robinsons invited a challenge from the Service.
Practitioners initiating lawsuits on behalf of injured clients
should carefully consider the initial theories they will plead. This
is particularly important in cases where damages such as lost
73. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
74. Id. at 471.
75. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 134.
76. Id. at 134. The percentages of the allocations in the jury verdict are listed
infra note 106. The McKay court likely gave the parties more discretion with respect
to the proportion of allocations in the agreement since the jury's damages verdict did
not allocate with specificity between the tort and contract claims. Thus it follows
that a verdict which does not specifically allocate damages to claims should give tax-
payers more leeway than one with specific allocations.
77. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 135.
78. Id. at 123.
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wages can be characterized either as tort or contract damages. A
successful recovery raising claims only in contract will yield a
taxable damage award to the plaintiff. Thus, practitioners should
think expansively when selecting theories. However, when the
claims are drafted into pleadings, the cases indicate that
pleadings which contain a clear tort component accompanied by
a clear contract component generate more credibility for the
taxpayer.
In this regard, practitioners should not ignore their ethical
obligations to accurately and honestly portray the nature of the
claim. Nonetheless, the scope of the term "personal injury" is
quite broad, allowing ample opportunity for counsel to character-
ize injuries as "personal" in appropriate cases. Thorough and
thoughtful lawyering, combined with prudent strategy and dili-
gent research, may yield both a tort and a contract claim appli-
cable to the factual circumstances.
In Seay v. Commissioner,79 the taxpayer successfully con-
vinced the Tax Court that part of a settlement he received from
his former employer constituted compensation for injury to his
personal reputation. The Seay decision reveals the importance of
securing a meaningful statement that the tortfeasor-payor in-
tended to pay damages on account of personal injury. In Seay,
the taxpayer's position as a corporate president was terminated
when a dispute arose between the taxpayer and the owners of
the corporation.0 The taxpayer refused to vacate his position;
consequently, the owners brought a highly-publicized trespass
action against him.8 The taxpayer felt his personal reputation
was damaged by the publicity.82 The settlement agreement
reached between the owners and the taxpayer provided for pay-
ment of one year's salary plus $45,000 for any damages caused
by the newspaper publicity.' An agreement in a letter specifi-
cally stated that the $45,000 was intended as "compensation for
such personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain and
injury to health and personal reputation in the community" that
the taxpayer suffered." The court in Seay found the evidence
indicated that the owners made the $45,000 payment to the
taxpayer to compensate him for any personal injuries suffered-a
79. 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
80. Id. at 33.
81. Id. at 33-34.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 34-35.
84. Id. at 33-35.
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tort or tort-like claim.85 The taxpayer therefore qualified for the
benefits of the 104(a)(2) exclusion." Even if, as in Seay, the
statement appears in a letter or document outside the settlement
agreement, the statement itself could provide significant evi-
dence that allocations made in a settlement agreement truly
reflected the payor's intent.
In contrast to the taxpayer in Seay, the taxpayers in Robin-
son failed to convince the court that their settlement agreement
contained a meaningful statement of the payor's intent." The
Bank knew that the Robinsons wanted to allocate any settlement
proceeds in a manner that would minimize their taxes, that the
Bank did not care about the manner of allocation, and that the
Bank allowed the Robinsons to allocate the settlement proceeds
in any manner they desired. Thus, the Robinson court found no
facts or circumstances that rendered the taxpayers' allocation of
damages in the final judgment meaningful.88 None of the evi-
dence indicated that the allocations were reached as a result of
arm's length negotiations. Instead, the court found:
Petitioners ... were given . . . the unfettered discretion to allo-
cate the settlement proceeds in any manner they desired in
order to minimize their Federal income tax liability. We find
that petitioners deliberately and unilaterally arrived at the
allocations contained in the final judgment solely with a view to
Federal income taxes, and not to reflect the realities of their
settlement. 9
On the other hand, the McKay court found that "the settle-
ment agreement provides the clearest embodiment of the payor's
intent .... 'o The court made that determination based on the
surrounding facts and circumstances, which supported the
parties' statements in the settlement agreement. Those facts and
circumstances included the hostile nature of the parties' negotia-
tions regarding the RICO claim, the nature of the claims in the
initial pleadings, the entire court record, and the trial judge's
involvement in the negotiations.9 The McKay court's finding on
the Company's intent shows that even a somewhat vague state-
ment92 explaining why the parties allocated settlement proceeds
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id.
87. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
88. Id. at 128-29.
89. Id. at 129.
90. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 484 (1994).
91. Id.
92. In its determination of the Company's intent, the McKay court focused on
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as they did may lead a court to find the payor's intent sufficient-
ly demonstrated, provided the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the allocations render that statement meaningful.
In Madson v. Commissioner," the Tax Court considered
evidence of a tortfeasor's intent found in an insurance contract to
allow the taxpayer's exclusion of his settlement award. There,
the taxpayer argued for the exclusion of his entire settlement in
an action against the City of Green Bay, Wisconsin, for forcing
him to retire at age sixty from his position as police chief. 4 Fol-
lowing a trial, the state court found that Green Bay had violated
the taxpayer's right to equal protection and had also breached its
employment contract with the taxpayer. The court awarded dam-
ages on the basis of lost earnings, loss of state retirement, and
loss of social security benefits. The court also determined that
the amount of damages would have been equal under both the
contract or equal protection causes of action. 5 During an appeal
by Green Bay, the parties agreed to settle the dispute for
$41,000.96 The Tax Court found that the payment compensated
for the taxpayer's equal protection claim. 7 The court reasoned
that because Green Bay's insurer paid the $41,000 and because
the insurance contract specifically excluded payments for breach
of contract, Green Bay must have intended to pay the taxpayer
for violation of the taxpayer's equal protection rights, a tort-type
injury. 8 Therefore, the 104(a)(2) exclusion was appropriate.
One might argue that determining a tortfeasor/payor's in-
tent, based on the language in an insurance contract, is some-
what artificial. Provided that other facts and circumstances ren-
der the statement or language meaningful, however, the McKay
and Madson decisions together indicate that the court will find
the payor's intent sufficiently demonstrated even with a less
than direct statement from the parties. The McKay court accept-
ed the vague reference to estimates of appellate success in much
the following language in the settlement agreement: 'Ashland and McKay have both
relied upon their appellate counsel[s'] consensus estimate of McKay's probability
of appellate success with respect to [the wrongful discharge tort claim and the
breach of contract claim]." Id. at 484. Therefore, in similar situations, if taxpayers
memorialize their estimates of appellate success and if the facts and. circumstances
surrounding the allocation to the various claims render that statement meaningful,
those precautions should be sufficient to determine the intent of the payor.
93. T.C. Memo. 1988-325, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1615 (1988).
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the same way that the Madson court accepted the payor's intent
as discerned from the terms of the insurance contract. In other
words, both courts stretched to find that the payors intended
their payments to compensate for personal injuries.
Regardless of the language employed or whether the state-
ment of the payor's intent is found in a settlement document,
letter, or elsewhere, both the Robinson and McKay decisions
show that a court will analyze the underlying facts to determine
if the statement is meaningful. Therefore, such a statement
should be a concise explanation of the tort or tort-like injury for
which the taxpayer is being compensated. Again, the statement
must be meaningful because it could cause a court to deny the
payor's intent." Practitioners should demand that a settlement
document contain both express allocation language specifying
that payments will extinguish tort or tort-like claims and a spe-
cific statement of the payor's intent in doing so. Leaving one or
the other out of an agreement could expose settlements to unnec-
essary judicial scrutiny.
The importance of express language in the settlement agree-
ment and careful attention to the consequences of bargaining
was highlighted in Ray v. United States." In Ray, the Singer
Company settled a labor dispute arising from the closure of one
of its manufacturing plants. The union filed a complaint against
Singer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and
sought injunctive relief, based on the allegation that Singer had
engaged in misrepresentation and fraud. 1' The federal district
court refused to enjoin Singer, but found that Singer had
breached its collective bargaining agreement and indicated that
it would award monetary damages. The parties ultimately
agreed to a monetary settlement and the documents indicated
that all claims of the union were released and discharged." 2
After paying them, Singer issued each of the settlement
distributees a Form 1099.103 Finding no express language in
the settlement agreement allocating settlement proceeds to per-
sonal injury and considering Singer's intent as indicated by the
issuance of Form 1099, the Claims Court held section 104(a)(2)
99. It is worth noting that the taxpayer carries the burden of proving that the
settlement allocations were made in good faith. See Robinson, 102 T.C. at 128 n.19.
100. 25 Cl. Ct. 535, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 50,187, 69 A.F.T.R.2d 92-953
(1992), affd, 989 F.2d 1204 (1993).
101. 25 Cl. Ct. at 536-37.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 541.
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inapplicable." Based on its holding on the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the court never had to reach the issues of fraud
and misrepresentation." 5
Ray suggests the importance of drafting settlement agree-
ments carefully. Because the complaint alleged tortious actions
(fraud and misrepresentation) on Singer's part, it would appear
that the union gave up an excellent opportunity to negotiate for
the allocation of at least part of the settlement proceeds to per-
sonal injury. No such effort was made, however. Unlike the
McKay court,'° the Ray court found no evidence of negotiation
or discussion between the parties regarding the tax implications
of the awards made to the employees. '°7 Ray also suggests that
the issuance of a Form 1099 by a payor will, almost without
exception, demonstrate to the court that the payor intended that
the payment constitute income to the taxpayer. Practitioners
should therefore negotiate, as part of the settlement, that either
no Form 1099 be issued, or that it be issued with the qualifica-
tion that the settlement compensates for tort-like injuries.
B. The McKay Court's Liberal Application of Section 104(a)(2)
The Robinson and McKay decisions were decided within one
month of each other and reflect the application of the principles
established in earlier 104(a)(2) cases. However, the McKay deci-
sion appears to be more generous to the taxpayer. The McKay
court, like the Robinson court, applied the standard that express
allocations in settlement agreements will be respected for tax
purposes if they are entered into in an adversarial context, at
arm's length, and in good faith.
Unlike the Robinson court, the McKay court found that the
parties involved negotiated adversarially in allocating damages
between tort and contract theories. However, the court relied on
vague language in the settlement agreement to support that
finding and to demonstrate the intent of the Company. The
McKay settlement agreement referred to the wrongful discharge
104. Id.
105. Id. at 540.
106. McKay, 102 T.C. at 472. The McKay finding is arguably suspect if one
closely examines the primary focus of the Company-McKay negotiations, which ap-
pear to have been on the RICO claims, and the overall amount of the settlement as
opposed to the characterization of the proceeds as derived from either tort or con-
tract claims.
107. 25 Cl. Ct. at 541.
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and breach of contract claims only as "the two other claims.""°8
With the exception of the following statement: "[The Company]
and McKay have both relied upon their appellate counsel[s']
consensus estimate of McKay's probability of appellate success
with respect to the two other claims,""° the court referred to no
other express allocation language that might explain how the
parties arrived at the allocation of damages to tort or contract
theories.
The opinion contains few facts that would clearly support a
finding that the tort and contract allocation negotiations were
adversarial. Instead, the court seemed to apply the adversarial
negotiation context of the RICO claim to the negotiations on tort
and contract allocations. The court noted that "Ashland wanted
to minimize the amount it needed to pay [McKay] as well as
avoid making any payments on account of [McKay's] RICO
claim.""' Regardless of the amount, the Company would not
have benefitted by allocating damages to the contract claim in-
stead of the tort claim. Under either allocation scenario, the
Company could have claimed a section 162 ordinary and neces-
sary business expense deduction for its payment of tort or con-
tract damages. The McKay court responded to the Service's same
argument, noting that the Bank in Robinson "was not concerned
with the allocation among the taxpayers' various claims.""'
The court concluded that "[a]lthough the deductibility of the
payor's payment might be [one] factor to consider in deciding
whether the parties are adverse to their allocations, it is not
controlling. " "
The Company resisted any mention of RICO violations in
the settlement document because it wished to avoid negative
publicity. A wrongful discharge tort claim or a breach of contract
claim would have generated little, if any, negative publicity to
the Company. Therefore publicity considerations probably had
little impact on the Company's negotiation posture with regard
to tort and contract allocations.
It is reasonable to conclude that once the Company and
McKay had agreed to exclude any mention of RICO violations in
the settlement agreement, the only issue remaining was the
amount of damages the Company would pay for the wrongful
108. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
109. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484; see also supra note 88.
110. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
111. Id. at 483.
112. Id. at 485.
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discharge and breach of contract claims. In footnote nineteen, the
McKay court noted that although the court did not decide the
issue, if the Company had in fact made a settlement payment on
account of RICO, "the deductibility of such a payment to [the
Company] could be uncertain, ""' an assertion that seems alto-
gether irrelevant to the issue properly before the court: whether
the tort and contract allocation negotiations were actually ad-
verse or not.
Although the statements in the settlement agreement were
somewhat indirect as to the Company's intent, other persuasive
facts and circumstances clearly affected the McKay court's deci-
sion. First, the court noted that, unlike Judge Evins in Robinson,
the presiding trial judge in McKay played a primary role in the
negotiations process between the Company and McKay."4 In
fact, the trial judge encouraged the settlement figure upon which
the parties eventually agreed."1 Although the court did not ex-
plicitly state it, presumably the trial judge would have had an
opportunity to independently review the allocations in the
McKay settlement agreement.
Second, the McKay court noted that "the allocations in the
settlement agreement are consistent with the entire record in
that petitioner's pleadings and jury verdict reflect a lawsuit
sounding primarily in tort.""6 Similarly, a comparison of the
proportions of the jury verdicts in Robinson and McKay reveals
that the McKay allocations were far closer to the proportions
allocated by the jury than those in Robinson. In Robinson, the
jury awarded 2.76 percent of damages to the tort claim of mental
anguish,"7 yet the parties allocated ninety-five percent to men-
tal anguish in the settlement agreement. In McKay the jury did
not clearly allocate between the tort or contract theories of recov-
ery, but the aggregate amount of the verdict derived from the
tort and contract theories closely paralleled that in the McKay
settlement agreement." 8 The court specifically stated that the
pleadings and other court documents reflected a case sounding
primarily in tort with a contract component."9 Also, the trial
113. Id.
114. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The Robinsons' jury awarded $1,500,000 of a total verdict of $54,260,000 for
past and future mental anguish. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 121, 123. The author calcu-
lated the percentage as follows:1,500,000/54,260,00 = 2.76%.
118. McKay, 102 T.C. at 471-72.
119. Id. at 484.
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judge would presumably have noted an inappropriate allocation
to one theory over another.
Third, the language McKay's counsel used in the pleadings
and settlement agreement indicates that they clearly understood
the relevant case law under section 104(a)(2). Although there
may be some question as to how adversarial the settlement nego-
tiations on allocation of damages to tort or contract theories
actually were, McKay's counsel presented the court with a finely
tailored settlement agreement and set of facts that supported a
favorable ruling.
C. A Well Concealed Punitive Damage Award
The McKay ruling was quite favorable to McKay from anoth-
er perspective. While the court respected the damage allocations,
the size of the total damages award seemed directly connected to
the treble punitive damages the jury assigned to the RICO
claim." ° According to the court, McKay's slim chance of pre-
serving his entire jury award on appeal influenced the settle-
ment agreement. Since the parties' allocation of damages
closely paralleled the jury allocation to tort and contract claims,
the parties appeared to project that the appellate court would
reverse the punitive damage award and leave the entire compen-
satory award untouched. The Robinson court reasoned that "the
jury verdict.., should be taken into account in our apportion-
ment of th[e] settlement."" Following this rationale, the
McKay court should have made a similar comparison of the pro-
portion of damages in the settlement agreement to original theo-
ries alleged at trial. Under other circumstances, the estimate
may have been reasonable, but the evidence of the Company's
RICO violations and the jury's findings on the RICO claim indi-
cate that an appellate award would have allocated some damag-
es based on the Company's blatant RICO violations. The esti-
mate of the proportion of appellate damages found in the settle-
ment agreement, and the court's subsequent acceptance of those
estimates, therefore appears contrived.
The importance of this issue lies in the fact that punitive
damages do not generally qualify for the section 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion from gross income. Only punitive damages derived from
120. Id. at 471.
121. See supra note 88.
122. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 134.
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physical injury qualify for the exclusion.'23 If the parties had
allocated the settlement proceeds in proportion to reduced appel-
late damages on tort, contract, RICO, and punitive theories of
recovery, only damages allocated to the tort theory would have
been excluded. If damages had been allocated in the settlement
agreement in proportion to the jury award allocations on the four
theories of tort, contract, RICO and punitive damages, and the
court had held such a RICO/punitive component includable in
gross income, approximately 67.6 percent of the settlement pro-
ceeds would have been taxable income to the McKays. Under the
court's holding, however, approximately 14.3 percent of the ag-
gregate amount of proceeds allocated to the tort and contract
claims in the settlement agreement were included in gross in-
come. 2' Ultimately, the entire amount of the compensatory
component of the jury award was preserved in the settlement
agreement. Clearly one could not overstate the significant tax
benefit which accrued to McKay as a result.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, any case involving the issue of exclusion of set-
tlement awards under section 104(a)(2) will be a fact-specific
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding litigation and settle-
ment negotiations. McKay demonstrates that the court will re-
spect express language in settlement documents if the evidence
shows that the parties negotiated in an adversarial context and
at arm's length with regard to allocation of damages to personal
injury claims. McKay shows that the prime hurdle of the
104(a)(2) exclusion-intent of the payor--can be overcome if the
facts show that the express allocation language of settlement
123. For settlements taking place after July 10, 1989, § 104(a) excepts punitive
damage awards in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness from the
exclusion provisions of § 104(a)(2). I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Prior to
July 10, 1989, the issue of whether any punitive damages were deductible was very
much in doubt. For an excellent example of the arguments in favor and against the
exclusion of punitive damages, compare the majority opinion and Judge Trott's dis-
senting opinion in Hawkins v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 1077 (1994) with the majority
opinion and Judge Trott's concurring
opinion in Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (1994). For an in-depth discussion
of the case law background and an analysis of the effect of the 1989 amendment on
punitive damage recoveries, see Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax
Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAW. 783
(1992). See also James D. Ghiardi, The Federal Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards,
11 J.L. & COM. 1 (1991).
124. These percentages were calculated by the author using the figures found in
McKay, 102 T.C. at 471-74.
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agreements is bona fide.
Taxpayers can rest assured that in light of decisions like
Robinson and McKay, the Service will continue to contest the
exclusion of settlement proceeds under section 104(a)(2) in simi-
lar circumstances. Therefore, a practitioner wishing to avail an
injured client of the benefits of 104(a)(2) should be fully informed
of the factors courts focus on in allowing the exclusion. The les-
sons provided by previous taxpayer efforts provide a useful reci-
pe to practitioners. Those lessons should be carefully studied and
applied from the opening of a case file, through the litigation
stage, and into the settlement phase if necessary. Properly ap-
plied, the principles elicited from McKay and prior personal
injury exclusion cases could well lead a taxpayer to the safe har-
bor of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
25
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